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The festivities at Opis in 324 B.C. are connected 
historically with the concept of Homonoia which 
was clearly stated into existence by Alexander the 
Great. It is the contention of the author that it was 
meant to personify or portray the Grand Policy 
of Alexander. It marked the beginning of Alexander’s 
aim to consolidate his position over the vast em­
pire which his conquests had created.
The empire of the East presented far more 
difficult and complex problems for Alexander and 
the Macedonians, than the small, relatively homoge­
neous Hellenic world had previously faced. The old 
policies of both Philip and Alexander were designed 
for a small empire with analogous problems and 
conflicts. Consequently the Hellenic oriented policies 
were severely limited to deal with the numerous and 
large problems which were beseting the empires of the 
Orient.
Homonoia was to become the ideological corner­
stone of Alexander’s Grand Policy which was in the 
process of formation, in order to meet the challen­
ges of the new empire, to arrest or check problems 
which it could not solve and to create a new 
world order. I do not exclude the possibility that 
Alexander was motivated by a noble inspiration and 
desire for world unity. However, Homonoia came 
to be identified with political forces such as foreign 
policy, leadership and political institutions, and it 
was translated into political terms. Thus, Homonoia 
was a force of arrest and creation simultaneously 
and consisted of the following features:
a) the fusion of cultures
b) deification of Alexander
c) economic reorganization of the empire
d) social and nationalistic revolutions, the re­
turn of mercenaries, and the arresting of the conflict
e) an enlightened personal rule and the incor­
poration of certain features of an imperialistic de­
mocracy.
a. fusion of cultures
Alexander of Macedonia was only twenty years 
old when he became king in 336 B.C., succeeding his 
father Philip, who was assassinated the same year. 
According to Plutarch, Alexander the Great was 
born on the sixth day of Hecatombaeon, probably 
in July or August of 356 B. C. He was the son of 
Philip II and Olympias. Olympias came from the 
royal house of Epirus and traced her descent from 
Achilles. From his father’s side, Alexander was a 
descendant of Heracles through Caranus.1
1. Plutarch, Lives, Voi. VII, Second Edition. Translated by 
Bernadotte Perrin. New York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1928, p. 
225.
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Alexander grew up under the strong influence 
of his mother as well as his father. His relationship 
to Heracles, the greatest hero of the Hellenic world, 
was probably beyond any serious question.1 At 
the age of thirteen, Philip entrusted him to Aristotle 
who had become the most influential of Plato’s 
pupils. Aristotle taught Alexander philosophy, me­
dicine, botany, zoology and geography, and inspired 
him with deep love of the art of healing, poetry and 
Greek culture.2
When Alexander became the king of Macedonia 
in 336, be had already acquired a consideiable a- 
mount of knowledge in theory from his teacher, Aris­
totle, and in practice from his father and his gener­
als. Philip and his generals taught Alexander the 
art of war, diplomacy and administration. Early 
in 340 B.C. Philip left Alexander in charge of the 
government of Macedonia when he set out to conquer 
Byzantium.3
Alexander remained in charge of the government 
for more than a year. His ability to continue the 
efficient administration of Philip was demonstrated 
quite well. Alexander’s test in the art of war came 
only two years later in 338 B.C. in the Battle of Chae- 
ronea. In this particular military engagement, Alex­
ander displayed great bravery and won from Philip 
the highest approval.4 Plutarch says that Philip was 
happy to hear the Macedonians say after the Battle 
of Chaeronea that Alexander was king and Philip 
the general.5
In the diplomatic arena Alexander demonstrated 
his ability by the agreement which he concluded 
with the Athenians in 338 B.C.6 The death of Philip 
found the Macedonians preparing for an invasion of 
Persia as it had been decided by the first pan-Hel­
lenic Council of Corinth in 338 B.C.
It was the early spring of 334 B. C. when Alexander 
set out to invade the Persian Empire with a force 
of about 45,000 troops. The strategic plans of Alex­
ander were not entirely of his own. The decision 
to invade Persia had been made by Philip II and 
was approved by the first pan-Hellenic Congress 
at Corinth in 338 B.C. An invasion of combined 
Greek forces under the direction of Macedonia 
against the Persian Empire was high on the agenda of 
Macedonia’s foreign policy. The Persian control of 
Asia Minor, the Asiatic coast of the important straits 
of the Dardanelles, and the Black Sea was a
1. Ibid.
2. Fuller, J.F.C., The Generalship of Alexander the Great. 
London: Eyre and Spottiswood, 1958, p. 57.
3. Wheeler, Benjamin Ide. Alexander the Great. The 
Merging of East and West in Universal History. New York: 
G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1900, p. 64.
4. Ibid., p. 69.
5. Op. cit., Plutarch, Lives, p. 245.
6. Op. cit., Wheeler, p. 72.
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monumental threat and obstacle to Macedonia’s 
policy of expansion. Philip’s victories against the 
various eastern Balkan tribes and his success in the 
dismantling of the Athenian Empire in southeastern 
Thrace and the northeastern Aegean were meaningless 
as long as the Great king controlled Asia Minor. 
Through the Greek city-states of Asia, the Persian 
king could instigate revolutions and interfere very 
easily in the internal affairs of the Macedonian 
Empire as he had done with the Greek city-states 
in 383 by the Treaty of Sousa and in 378 through the 
Peace of Antalcidas.
Thus Alexander’s first important decision was 
very consistent with the basic principles of Macedo­
nian foreign policy. This vast empire covered a ter­
ritory of more than fifty times that of bis own and 
had a population twenty-five times as great.
A brief timetable of Alexander’s conquests is as 
follows:7
334 B.C. 
334 B.C. 
333 B.C. 
332 B.C. 
332 B.C. 
331 B.C. 
331 B.C. 
327-326 B.C.
The Invasion of Asia Minor 
The Battle of Granicus 
The Battle of Issus 
The Siege of Tyre 
The Invasion of Syria and Egypt 
The Conquest of Syria and Egypt 
The Battle of Gaugamela or Arbela 
The Invasion of India
Thus, in a relatively brief period of seven years 
Alexander managed to bring the entire Middle East 
under his military control. As soon as he had ac­
complished this task, he set out to those conquered 
peoples as well as to the Greeks a new order of life 
based upon the principle of Homonoia. It is this single 
principle which can be used as a mirror in order 
to reflect the role of Alexander in world history and 
the historical process of the fourth century B. C.
Ten years had passed since the time that Alexan­
der had set foot on the Asian continent. During those 
years the war of conquest had been successfully 
carried out. Alexander decided that a grand five days’ 
holiday was necessary in order to celebrate a unique 
festival which would emphasize the successful com­
pletion of the war and the beginning of a new era of 
international understanding and cooperation between 
the victors and the vanquished. The festival was to 
symbolize the marriage of Europe and Asia.8 
Alexander himself married Statil a who was the oldest 
daughter of Darius. Hephaestion received Drypetis, 
a younger daughter; Craterus, a niece of Darius; 
Perdicas, the daughter of the satrap of Media; Pto­
lemy and Eumenes, two daughters of Artabazus;
7. Ibid., p. 208.
8. Ibid., p. 476.
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Nearchus, the daughter of Mentor; Seleucus, the 
daughter of Spitamenes the Bactrion.1
Along with the plan of promoting intermarriage 
as a positive step towards building a new order, Alex­
ander was facing seriously the question of the reor­
ganization of the army in order to promote better 
the concept of Homonoia. Many of his Greek troops 
had grown old and were no longer fit for fighting. 
Many of them had already shown a basic disagree­
ment with his treatment of the conquered races.
In reorganizing the army Alexander found that 
at least ten thousand of his Greek troops (mainly 
from Macedonia) would have to be retired and sent 
back home. At the same time he began to introduce 
regiments of Bactrians, Partbians, Arachotians, and 
Zarangians into his army. Many of these Asiatic 
armies had already fought bravely with him in the 
Indian invasion of 327-326 B.C. This, of course, 
also constituted a political move, and it was clearly 
in line with the generous and noble treatment which 
Alexander had already given to the conquered races.
Since his stay in Egypt Alexander seems to have 
begun to understand that the best policy of establish­
ing an enduring and successful government in a 
foreign territory was to be based primarily upon a 
close and honest cooperation between the victor and 
the conquered.2 The principle of cooperation had 
been developed by and large by his father, and it 
was incorporated into the Macedonian foreign pol­
icy. The treatment of Athens and other Greek city- 
states, which, with the exception of Thebes, sub­
mitted to Macedonia’s power, was generous, and they 
were urged to join a cooperative organization. Philip 
discovered that brute force alone could not serve 
best the imperial interests of his state and he was 
glad to share his culture, religion and economic 
interests with other states as long as the basic in­
terests of Macedonia were promoted.
However, what Alexander seems to have under­
stood well while he was in Egypt was that the principle 
of cooperation had to assume greater dimensions 
and a broader base. The Macedonian principle of 
cooperation was limited only to the Greeks, and it 
was not applicable to the barbarians; Alexander 
found that the time had come to break down the bar­
rier of barbarism and to reform this principle if he 
was to use it meaningfully and effectively in his new 
empire.
When Alexander announced his decision to 
promote cooperation between the victor and van­
quished to the army in the summer of 324 at Opis, a 
storm of protests was raised immediately by the
1. Ibid., p. 477.
2. Savill, Agnes, Alexander the Great and His Time.
London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1950, p. 56.
Greek troops. They felt that they had been used by 
Alexander, and now when he found them useless he 
was casting them aside. Many of Alexander’s troops 
had already been annoyed; they were angry with his 
identification with the Oriental culture and speci­
fically with his assumption of Oriental dress and his 
favorable behavior towards his new subjects and their 
gods.3
In replying to their protests and charges of total 
submission to the culture of the barbarians, Alexan­
der angrily ordered the execution of thirteen soldiers 
and took immediate steps to reorganize the army. 
He ordered the formation of Persian units, some 
bearing Greek names, in order to replace the Mac­
edonian units which were in the state of revolt.
As soon as Alexander’s decision became known, 
his soldiers, heartbroken, came to the doors of his 
palace and they refused to leave unless Alexander 
would forgive them. With tears in his eyes, the King 
came immediately out to meet his weeping troops 
and he listened to the grievances of his troops 
pronounced through their spokesman Callines: ΤΩ 
βασιλεύ, τά λυποϋντά έστι Μακεδόνας ότι σύ Περ- 
σ&ν μέν τινας ήδη πεποίησαι σαυτφ συγγενείς, 
καί καλούνται Πέρσαι συγγενείς ’Αλεξάνδρου καί 
φιλοΰσί σε. Μακεδόνων δέ οϋπω τις γέγευται ταύ- 
της τής τιμής.4
To these charges Alexander replied: Άλλ’ υμάς 
γε, εφη, ξύμπαντας έμαυτφ τίθεμαι συγγενείς καί τό 
γε άπό τούτου ουπω καλέσω.5
Following this act of reconciliation, the troops 
returned joyfully to their camp while Alexander 
ordered the celebration of the event by a great 
feast. In this gigantic feast, Greeks, Persians, In­
dians and other national groups sat next to each 
other, dancing, singing and drinking from the same 
bowl. Alexander prayed for many blessings and es­
pecially for Homonoia·6 Ευχετο δέ τά τε άλλα άγα- 
θά καί όμόνοιάν τε καί κοινωνίαν τής άρχής τοΐς 
τε Μακεδόσι καί Πέρσαις. Western translations like 
the Loeb Series identify Homonoia with Harmony. 
This tendency has led to serious gaps in the scholarly 
research concerning ideological and political prob­
lems in the fifth and fourth century B.C. Plato uses 
both concepts in the Republic with distinctly different 
meaning and intent.
Aristotle says that Homonoia approaches closely 
friendship (Ή δ’ όμόνοιά έστι μέν σύνεγγυς τή 
φιλίμ). Homonoia presupposes that people have mu-
3. Arrian, History of Alexander the Great and Indica. 
Translated by E. Iliff Robson. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1949, p. 227.
4. Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander, VII, ii, 3-8.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 241. (Loeb, P.A. Brunt and others translate 
Homonoia to harmony.)
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tuality in their thought process and possess the 
directly analogus determination aiming towards a 
common achievement. Isocrates speaks often about 
Homonoia as an ideological basis for pan-Hellenic 
unity. Shaken with emotion Alexander the Great 
prays for Homonoia at Opis in 324 B.C.
The translation of Homonoia to harmony is not 
correct. 'Ομόνοια (Homonoia) means union of mind, 
ψυχή and body. The word 'Ομόνοια carries with it 
some kind of noble and spontaneous community 
spirit, it implies dynamic action and movement, it 
transcends conflict, it seeks catharsis and γαλήνη 
for the blood stained human civilization, it lifts man 
from the earthly world and thrusts him toward the 
rising sun.
The scenes which took place at Opis symbolize 
and underline the climax of Alexander’s drive for 
Homonoia. He demonstrated that he wanted some 
kind of unity to be established among the Greeks, the 
Persians and other tribal or racial groups. At Opis 
Alexander clearly departs from the political philo­
sophy of his teacher, Aristotle. It seems that Alexan­
der arrived at the conclusion that the line between 
barbarians and non-barbarians had to be drawn, 
not on racial, ethnic or tribal boundaries but rather 
on individual ones based on Greek ideals such as 
φιλία and άρετή.1
I must now try to explore the development of 
Homonoia in the mind of Alexander. In this explora­
tion I will try to show the relationship of such a 
process, to the experiences, difficulties and policies 
of Alexander.
Plutarch suggests that Alexander had at least a 
plan concerning the reorganization of the East 
after her submission to his will.2 This plan was prob­
ably vague but, nonetheless, it proposed to better 
the civilization, culture and welfare of the peoples 
of the East.
Concerning the treatment which Alexander re­
served for the vanquished, Plutarch goes on the say 
that Alexander did not follow Aristotle’s advice 
to treat gently the Greeks and harshly the non-Greeks 
but like a hero aware of his cosmopolitan mission 
tried to unite all his subjects into a congenial so­
ciety, offering without discrimination the olive 
branch or the thunder to everybody.3
From these statements it seems apparent that 
Alexander realized that the security and ultimate 
survival of this empire was directly linked with 
Homonoia which was to identify with the refined, re­
evaluated, enlarged and reformed old Macedonian 
foreign policy principle of cooperation. Diodorus
1. P.A. Brunt, Greece and Rome (1965), pp. 215.
2. Plutarch, Moralia, Vol. IV: Ttanslated by Frank Cole 
Babbitt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 341.
3. Ibid., p. 397-399.
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Siculus says that Alexander was planning to move 
in the future against «the Carthaginians and the others 
who live along the Coast of Libya and Iberia and the 
adjoining coastal region as far as Sicily.»4
Alexander’s future plans and intentions are not 
at all clear at this point. Although we do not know how 
accurate and reliable Diodorus’s source is, one can 
safely conclude that if Alexander had any plans 
whatsoeier, involving future conquests either in the 
East or in the West, he had to consolidate his con­
quests up to this point. We know that Greece was not 
at all pacified and remained potentially the most 
troublesome area of the Empire. We also know that 
most of the Macedonian troops were old and tired 
after many years of fighting.
If we assume that Alexander was guided by ele­
mentary common sense he could rely neither on the 
Greeks, nor on his old and tired Macedonian troops 
to keep the empire under control; and if he was any 
kind of Strategos he must have known that before 
going on hoping to rule what he conquered, he had 
to secure his back by making some sense out of the 
chaos which his brilliant victories had produced. 
If Alexander was to put his house in order even for 
a period of a few years in order to return to Mace­
donia or to go on conquering the rest of the world, 
then he had to rely on some kind of cooperation 
from his subjects. For if Alexander failed to think 
this way, we must conclude that he was nothing but 
an egocentric megalomaniac or a dreamer, totally 
controlled by his evergrowing passion to kill, conquer 
and destroy. It is conceivable that Alexander was 
guided in some period of his life by the shadow of 
Achilles.5 It is dangerous, however, to conclude that 
Alexander never responded to social and political 
problems and never considered «purely rational cal­
culations.»® Although Alexander did not have to be 
the author of brotherhood idea he could have used 
it just as well for his own purposes.
However, Plutarch seems to believe that Alex­
ander had formulated a plan concerning Homonoia 
before he crossed the Hellespont in 334 B.C., and that 
his treatment of the Asiatic peoples as well as his 
reorganization of the empire were simply implemen­
tations of his pre-formulated policy.7
However, Plutarch does not tell us to what extent 
Alexander was committed to Homonoia before he 
undertook his campaign against Persia and to what 
degree and detail his plans were formulated before 
334 B. C. To conclude as Plutarch does, that Alexan­
der had a plan formulated well in advance, it seems
4. Diodorus Siculus, Vol. VII, Book XVII, p. 21.
5. Arrian, 1. 12. 1.
6. P. A. Brunt, Greece and Rome, 1965, pp. 208.
7. Ibid., p. 401.
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to me, is not safe. Rather, I think, it is more proper 
to measure Alexander’s commitment to Homonoia 
in the light of the growing opposition from his 
generals and his troops to his treatment of the 
vanquished peoples and the ways in which he was 
reorganizing the East.
From 330 B.C. to 327 B.C. a constant deterioration 
of relations between Alexander and his troops, his 
staff, and his generals can easily be accounted for 
from the information supplied both by Arrian and 
Plutarch.
Around July, 330 B. C., Darius was dead. This 
meant that Alexander was now the undisputed leader 
of the Persian Empire. The Persian opposition to 
Alexander came to an end with Darius’ death and 
now Alexander showed a commitment to the principle 
of respecting and vitalizing existing institutions 
of government which displayed some validity and 
efficiency.1 Persian noblemen and other capable 
leaders were admitted to Alexander’s court while 
Persian satraps were being restored to the control 
of the provinces which they before governed.2 Soon 
Alexander began occasionally assuming Oriental 
dress and displaying an increasing admiration and 
respect for the civilization and culture of the Orient. 
Plutarch says that Alexander preferred the Persian 
dress for its simplicity over the Median which was 
more or less a compromise between the Oriental 
and the Macedonian dress.3
During the autumn of 330 B.C., Alexander discover­
ed a plot against his life, and according to Arrian, 
Philotas, one of Alexander’s top generals and son 
of Parmenion, was convicted by clear proof. Philotas 
was executed and at the same time his father, Par­
menion, Was also put to death, mainly from fear of 
rebellion against the king. Philotas was the first Mac­
edonian of high rank who expressed openly his 
opposition to Alexander’s fair treatment and respect 
for the Oriental peoples and their civilization. Alex­
ander stood firm in his decision and he paid the 
price of executing two of his best military leaders. 
The death of Parmenion was especially a dark spot 
in the career of Alexander, because Parmenion was 
the oldest of his generals and had guided both Phi­
lip and Alexander to great victories.
Following this incident, another one occurred in 
328 B.C. in Samarkand, which constitutes the most 
grievous misdeed of Alexander. This particular 
incident involves the murder of Clitus, the man who 
had saved his life in the battle of Granicus, by Alex-
1. Op. cit., Wheeler, p. 384.
2. Diodorus Siculus, Vols. VII, Vili and IX. Translated by 
C.H. Oldfather. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1963, 
p. 341.
3. Op. cit., Plutarch, Moralia, p. 403.
ander personally. Both Plutarch and Arrian believed 
that Alexander and Clitus had lost control of their 
tempers from excessive drinking at a supper held 
in honor of Dioscuri. However, in the bitter verbal 
exchange between Clitus and Alexander there is re­
vealed the deep resentment of Clitus to Alexander’s 
plan and belief in cultural fusion, and at the same 
time Alexander’s commitment to HomonoiaA
Still another incident occurred in 327 B.C. which 
dramatizes further the growing commitment of Alex­
ander to new cosmopolitanism. Following Phi- 
lotas and Clitus, it was now Callisthenes, the philo­
sopher, a relative of Aristotle, and Anaxarchus of 
Abdera, who opposed openly the act of Proskynesis 
(prostration). This act had been introduced by Alex­
ander as a form of etiquette from the Oriental 
culture.8
Callisthenes had also criticized the growing trend 
of cosmopolitanism. These acts of Callisthenes, as well 
as his involvement in a plot against Alexander’s life, 
infuriated Alexander and soon Callisthenes was ar­
rested, under orders from Alexander. He died some 
months later in chains. The death of Callisthenes 
created hostility between Alexander and Aristotle.® 
Theophrastus, in a pamphlet, branded Alexander as a 
tyrant and Demetrius of Phalerum joined Cassander, 
the enemy of Alexander. Theophrastus and Deme­
trius worked out a doctrine of chance which was 
applied to Alexander while the Peripatetic School, 
of which Callisthenes had been a member, projected 
Alexander as a despot and a tyrant.7
In the early spring of 327 B.C., Alexander 
launched a clean-up operation in order to subdue 
certain tribes in the extreme East of Sogdiana. 
While defeating the Bactrians there, Alexander fell 
in love with Roxana, the daughter of Oxayartes. 
According to Arrian, Alexander did not use the 
right of the conqueror in order to take Roxana, 
but he proposed an honorable marriage. Plutarch 
also believed that Alexander’s marriage to Roxana 
was a dignified love affair.8
This noble act of Alexander seems to constitute 
another step in his policy of conciliation and amal­
gamation, to the disappointment of the Greek Old 
Guard. If we sum up and assess the importance of the 
above-mentioned incidents, one can observe a con­
stant growth in Alexander’s commitment to Homo­
noia, particularly from 330 to 324 B.C. The highest 
degree of Alexander’s commitment to Homonoia 
was reached at Opis in 324 B.C.
4. Op. cit., Plutarch, Lives, p. 321.
5. Op. cit., Wheeler, p. 411.
6. Op. cit., Plutarch, Lives, p. 385.
7. Op. cit., Tarn, Hellenestic Civilization, p. 82.
8. Op. cit., Plutarch, Lives, pp. 360-361.
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b. Alexander’s deification
The issue concerning Alexander’s deification has 
been a controversial argument among historians 
regarding its substance and validity, as well as its 
purpose and meaning. I intend not to take part in the 
dispute; rather it seems to me it is necessary to bring 
about an account of Alexander’s visit both to the 
temple of the Delphic Apollo in 335 B.C. and to the 
temple of Ammon at Siwah in the midwinter of 332- 
331 B.C.
From Plutarch we have the information that 
Alexander received the title ανίκητος («invincible» 
or «unconquered») from Pythia when he visited the 
sacred temple of Apollo at Delphi in 335 B.C. How­
ever, Diodorus says that Alexander received the 
title of Invincible from Ammon at Siwah. Clearly, 
there is here a basic disagreement between the two 
historians as to the place and time, when Alexander 
received this title. But no historian dealing with 
Alexander has ever questioned the existence of a 
legend concerning this issue. There are some valid 
reasons to defend Alexander’s deification on the 
ground of the psychological and political utility of 
such a move. W.W. Tarn believes that the deification 
«was entirely a political matter.»1
It seems quite logical that the psychological 
reasons were also very important. Psychologically, 
it was necessary for a supreme leader and ruler to 
project on the masses of his subjects the supreme 
image with which they could identify. Since the re­
ligions of the Middle East were polytheistic, allowing 
for the existence of a large number of different gods 
who had a human personality full of passions and 
desires, Alexander’s deification could produce a 
supreme devotion on the part of his subjects to his 
leadership and could make the masses identify more 
readily with his goals and drives, thus eliminating a 
great deal of possible opposition to Homonoia. 
It seems also probable that the masses of Asia were 
in need of heroes to whom they attributed superna­
tural qualities, because of the profound crisis which 
their religions were facing.
Consequently one may view Alexander as the 
super human who spreads the gospel of Homonoia. 
His deified personality fulfils the psychological need 
of the masses for the supernatural and thus enhances 
the moral power and appeal of Homonoia.
c. the economic reorganization of the empire
The measures of finance and economic develop­
ment that Alexander conceived in order to organize 
his empire on a new economic basis after the military
1. Tam, W. W., Alexander the Great, Vol. I : Narrative.
Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 112.
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conquests were terminated, are closely connected 
with Homonoia because they seem to be an integral 
part of his Grand Policy.
Planning to reorganize the economic structure of 
the Near East, Alexander found it necessary to 
engage in an exploration of the seas and the land. 
For this reason Archais was given the task of making 
certain preliminary surveys of the Coast of Arabia 
and of producing a detailed report concerning some 
possible inlets for harbors, docks and sites for new 
cities.2
The myths concerning the size and limits of the 
Caspian Sea were of a deep concern to Alexander and 
he intended to discover whether the Caspian Sea had 
any connection with the Great Ocean which was sup­
posedly encircling the Oikoumene. For this project 
a large number of ships were ordered to be construct­
ed on the shore of the Caspian Sea in order to be 
ready for the day when the expedition would be 
undertaken.
Another important problem concerning trade 
was the establishment of sea communications between 
India and Persia. Harbors and dockyards of great 
dimensions were ordered to be constructed at Baby­
lon and Patara. The Tigris River was made more nav­
igable, the harbors of Clazomenae and Erythrae 
were improved, while a new Phoenicia on the coast 
of the Persian Gulf was projected.3
In order to facilitate the exchange of commodities 
and to stimulate trade, Alexander revolutionized fi­
nance. One of the first problems which he attacked 
in the area of finance was that of coinage. The problem 
was to reconcile the decimal coinage of Persia (one 
gold daric—20 silver sigloi) with the duodecimal 
of Philip II (one gold stater, attic standard—24 
silver drachmae, Phoenician standard).4 The solu­
tion which Alexander proposed was based on the 
adoption of the Atbc standard, thus making the stater 
equal to 20 silver drachmae, which were acceptable in 
Asia. By doing this Alexander succeeded in avoid­
ing competition with the coinage of Athens and 
almost made her a trade partner. As the treasures 
of Darius which had remained hidden and out of 
circulation for a long time began to circulate freely 
over the empire, the Persian money was demonetised 
and the Persian gold fell below Philip’s basic ratio.5 
The uniformity of coinage stimulated and promoted 
trade to a large degree.
The project of city building was one of those at 
the top of Alexander’s list. Alexander engaged in an 
enormous city building project by founding at least 
17 cities. Even if we take this minimum figure of 16
2. Op. cit., Savill, p. 145
3. Op. cit., Fuller, p. 273.
4. Op. cit., Tarn, Alexander the Great, Vol. II, p. 130.
5. Ibid., p. 133.
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Alexandrias and one Alexandtrette,1 it is not dif­
ficult to appreciate the magnitude of this project. 
By building a number of cities Alexander initiated a 
vast scheme of colonization in Asia.2 However, 
this colonization was much different from the kind 
of colonization which the Greeks before Alexander 
had practiced because it was clearly and deliberately 
planned, and thus it was not restricted to building 
cities near the sea with a homogeneous group of set­
tlers. Alexander’s colonization included cities that 
were away from the sea, and settlers who were a mix­
ture of several diverse elements coming from groups 
with wide political, religious and cultural back­
grounds.3 A typical Alexandria was settled with 
Greek mercenaries, traders, natives and Macedo­
nians. Greek women were sent also into these set­
tlements to help balance the culture between the 
Greek and the Persian.
Diodorus says that Alexander was planning in 
conjunction with his future military campaigns against 
North Africa, Iberia and Sicily to build an elaborate 
network of shipyards and cities involving population 
shifts from one continent to another.4
Most of the Greek city-states depended on the 
non-Hellenic world for wheat and corn supplies. 
Thessaly and Macedonia were large producers of 
wheat, but the production was not enough to satisfy 
the requirements of the populations of the other 
city-states. In 330 B.C., Alexander decided to intro­
duce a solution to the problem of food shortage in 
Greece. Cyrene, a city in Northern Africa included in 
his empire, was to undertake the task of supplying 
the Greek states with corn from 330 until 326 B.C. 
The trade agreement between Cyrene and the Greek 
states was preceded by a friendship alliance between 
Cyrene and Alexander in 331 B.C. while he was 
on his way to visit the oracle of Ammon.5 Such a 
commercial intercourse was highly beneficial for 
Alexander’s efforts and desires to establish a firm 
control over his empire and to arrest the forces of 
disintegration. In Greece his prestige rose and the 
pro-Macedonian forces were strengthened. With 
the economic situation improving, possible social 
unrest due to food shortage was temporarily elim­
inated. The stimulation of trade in the eastern Med­
iterranean area produced positive effects on the 
economic stability of the area. The opening up of 
new lands by Alexander offered a relief to the de­
eming Greek trade.6
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Op. cit., Diodorus, Vol. VII, Book XVII, p. 21.
5. Op. cit., Diodorus, Voi. VII, Book XVII, p. 49.
6. Wason, Margaret, O., Class Struggle in Ancient Greece.
London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., p. 165.
d. social and nationalistic revolutions 
arresting of the conflict
The process of revolution which became so 
powerful before Alexander’s time, continued to under­
mine the structures of the Hellenic and Asiatic so­
cieties during Alexander’s reign as well. This prob­
lem was one of extreme concern for Alexander. The 
national independence struggle and the accompany­
ing social revolutions, were threatening the vast 
Macedonian empire with disintegration. Let us look 
at the national struggle and social revolutions 
during the reign of Alexander, and then consider the 
steps which Alexander took in order to improve the 
situation and to establish order and control over his 
subjects.
When Philip came to Corinth in 336 in order to 
attend the first pan-Hellenic Congress, he declared, 
to the delight of the pro-Macedonian delegates of 
the Congress, that any attempts for social revolution 
in the city-states would be crushed by the combined 
strength of the forces of the League and those of 
Macedonia.7
The first revolution which Alexander had to deal 
with were a series of uprisings in Thrace and Illyria. 
Local tribes in both regions tried to throw off the 
yoke of the Macedonian rule as soon as Philip died. 
Alexander brought his armed forces immediately 
into the revolted areas and crushed the Thracians 
first and the Illyrians soon after.8
The operations in Thrace and Illyria were still in 
progress when Alexander learned about the revolt 
of the Greek city-states.® The Thebans wanted to 
expel the garrison which Macedonia had placed in 
the Acropolis of the city and to rid themselves of 
their pro-Macedonian rulers who supported the 
army of occupation. At the same time they appealed 
to the Athenians and the peoples of other city-states 
for help.
Alexander rushed to the gates of Thebes leading 
his entire army. After a determined struggle for 
freedom or death, the Thebans submitted to the 
will of Alexander. More than six thousand The­
bans died for their freedom, while over thirty 
thousand were captured and the loss of property 
reached very large proportions. Alexander decided 
to punish the Thebans severely in order to demon­
strate beyond any doubt his determination to crush 
revolutions with all his might.
Alexander wanted to identify his decision with 
the interests of the League and the pro-Macedonian 
circles of Greece. So he put the fate of the Thebans
7. Ibid., p. 163.
8. Op. cit., Diodorus, Vol. VIII, Book XVI, p. 139.
9. Ibid.
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into the hands of the representatives of the Greek 
city-states who had participated in a meeting or­
ganized by him, in order to deal specifically with 
the case of Thebes.1
Following this action against Thebes, Alexander 
proceeded to demand that the Athenians surrender 
to him the leaders of the anti-Macedonian party. 
Because the people of Athens refused to betray 
Demosthenes and Lycurgus, their most effective 
leaders, and because they displayed a deep solidarity 
with the two men, Alexander withdrew his demand 
wanting probably to lessen the tensions between 
Macedonia and Athens and to strengthen the hand 
of the pro-Macedonian party of Athens.2
Five years after the destruction of Thebes in 
335 B. C. Alexander fought the battle of Arbela which 
decided the ultimate fate of the Persian Empire. 
When word came to Greece that Persia was ready 
to fight her most decisive battle against Alexander, 
the city-states decided to seize this last opportu­
nity and to strike against Macedonia for their free­
dom, being alarmed with the terrific growth of the 
Macedonian power. At the same time a revolution 
was in process in Thrace and this seemed to offer the 
Greeks an additional hope.3
While Antipater, the leader of Macedonia during 
Alexander’s absence, was preoccupied with the re­
volution in Thrace led by Memnon, the Spartans 
issued an appeal to all the Greeks to unite in defense 
of their freedom. Soon most of the Peloponnesians 
and the northern Greeks joined forces and declared 
war against Macedonia. Athens, however, stayed out 
of the revolt because the pro-Macedonian forces 
there were very strong.4
Antipater upon learning about the Greek revolt, 
came immediately to terms with the revolutionaries 
in Thrace and moved all his forces against the Greek 
revolution. In a furious battle that took place in 
Peloponnesos, Antipater crushed the revolution after 
sustaining heavy casualties.
In the meantime, social revolutions were going 
on in many islands of the Eastern Aegean Sea. In 
333 B. C. the admiral Memnon sailed against 
Lesbos, Chios and other islands of the Aegean and 
with the help of the oligarchical parties took control 
of these islands. Alexander responded immediately 
to the situation and encouraged the democratic 
elements of these states to fight against oligarchy. 
There are three inscriptions which vividly express
1. Ibid., p. 157.
2. Ibid., p. 159.
3. Hicks, E. L. and Hill, G. F., Greek Historical Inscrip­
tions. New and Revised Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1901. p. 305.
4. Op. cit., Tod, No. 193, p. 268; op. cit., Diodorus, Voi.
Vili, Book XVII, p. 297.
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the social struggle in these places, that became 
virtually a clash of oligarchy against democracy, 
stimulated by outside forces.5
In a letter to the Chians, Alexander «orders the 
return of all the Chians who were exiled by the oli­
garchy, to their city and the establishment there 
of a democratic constitution. A board of elected 
(νομογράφοι) law makers, whose number is not 
specified, is to record and correct the laws, removing 
anything which conflicts with the democratic govern­
ment of the state and with the restoration of the 
exiles, and the laws, so codified and amended, are to 
be submitted to Alexander for ratification. Chios 
is to supply at its own expense twenty fully equipped 
triremes to the King’s Hellenic fleet.»®
Alexander also ordered the punishment of all 
the Chians who cooperated with the Persians and 
supported oligarchy, by banishment from all the 
city-states. In the meantime, in cooperation with the 
council of the League of Corinth, Alexander ordered 
through a resolution of the League the trial of all 
the Chian citizens who supported oligarchy and who 
were still residing in Chios. Any dispute arising be­
tween returned exiles and those who stayed in the city 
should be judged in Alexander’s own court, and until 
a settlement was reached, the King was to station in 
the city an adequate garrison, which would be main­
tained by the Chians.
With the growth of the Macedonian power, the 
Athenian pro-Macedonian party also grew in size 
and importance. Isocrates and Demades were the 
leading figures of the pro-Macedonian movement 
in Athens. As this party grew with the help of the 
Macedonian power and influence, it sucessfully coun­
terbalanced the anti-Macedonian party of Demos­
thenes. The result of such a balance of political 
forces in Athens was a paralysis of the Athenian for­
eign policy. When the Spartans called for a pan-Hel­
lenic revolution against the Macedonians in 330 
B.C., the Athenians decided to remain neutral because 
of a deep split in their ranks. The majority of the 
Athenian masses favored, however, the revolution.7
With the power of Macedonia reaching unprece­
dented proportions and the revolution of 330 B.C. 
been crushed by Antipater, the struggle among the 
Athenians was greatly intensified. The party of De­
mosthenes became almost desperate for an opportu­
nity to revolt.
Late in 327 B.C. the state of Athens decided to 
honor Memnon II. The uncle of Memnon II, Memnon 
I, was the Admiral of the Greek mercenaries in 
the Battle of Issus. It is indeed very strange and
5. Op. cit., Hicks and Hill, pp. 294, 301, 303.
6. Op. cit., Tod, No. 192, pp. 263 , 264; op. cit., Hicks 
and Hill, No. 158, pp. 301, 302.
7. Op. cit., Hicks and Hill, p. 306.
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interesting to find Athens in 327 displaying such 
a courage as to honor a member of a family that 
had rendered such distinguished services to the 
Persian cause.1
Fully aware of the unrest in the Greek world, 
expressed in terms of national and class struggles, 
Alexander wanted tc arrest these forces and proceed­
ed to take certain steps in that direction to secure 
a better cooperation between the city-states and his 
empire. He dealt first with the problem of the exiles. 
The social strife in Greece during the fourth century 
led to a large number of revolutions fought primarily 
between the forces of oligarchy and democracy. 
Because of these revolutions, a large number of 
exiles gathered in Asia Minor, fleeing mainly from the 
fear of reprisals from the victorious party, and with 
the hope of returning to their states at a later time 
to instigate a counterrevolution. Alexander properly 
I ecognized that as long as these exiles remained away 
from their homes, they would always be a potential 
threat and could initiate the spark of revolution in his 
empire.
Under these circumstances, Alexander decided 
upon the restoration of the exiles. In the early au­
tumn of 324 he sent Nicanor to the Olympic fes­
tival with an Edict which pertained to the restoration 
of the exiles. The Olympic festival offered an excel­
lent propaganda ground, and thus Nicanor «caused 
the victorious herald» to read letters from Alexander 
which contained the decision of the King to restore 
all the Greek exiles except the Thebans and those 
who Were guilty of murder or sacrilege. In addition, 
he dissolved the Arcadian Leagues and other al­
liances, except the League of Corinth.2
Diodorus tells us that the measure was welcomed 
in most of the states, although there was some 
opposition from the Aetolians and the Athenians.3 
Thus Alexander’s attempt to arrest the social forces 
in Greece was an apparent success. The Edict Was 
therefore a wise exercise of personal power, in 
the interest of peace.4
e. Alexander’s enlightened personal rule 
and foreign policy
From the beginning of Alexander’s political ca­
reer, his actions appear to be directed to arrest and 
control the phenomena of class conflict, and those 
caused by political and national revolutions. He 
seems also interested to extend the foundations of 
Macedonian foreign policy which was based upon 
the principle of expansion in territory and influence.
1. Op. cit., Tod, No. 199, pp. 283, 284.
2. Op. cit., Tod, p. 297.
3. Op. cit., Diodorus, Vol., IX., Book XVIII, p. 35.
4. Op. cit., Hicks and Hill, p. 312.
Alexander’s mission was to understand the general 
phenomenon of the crisis, to examine the nature of 
various forces, to shape these social thrusts into a 
mainstream; thus directing the historical process. 
In this endeavour Alexander’s personal charisma 
becomes his most powerful weapon. Alexander’s 
moral quality was expressed vividly by his feelings 
of compassion for others. This quality was unique 
in the Ancient world. As W.W. Tarn writes, «No 
public man throughout Greek history is, I think, 
to have shown pity. It was womanly, and best left 
to poets and philosophers.»5 His treatment of women 
is also unique in the entire ancient history. On more 
than one occasion he demonstrated his special 
respect for women. When two Macedonian soldiers 
had outraged the wives of some of the mercenary 
soldiers, Alexander ordered Parmenion «in case the 
men were convicted, to punish them and put them to 
death as wild beast born for the destruction of man­
kind.»6 When the Macedonian troops entered vic­
torious into Persepolis, Alexander ordered them to 
spare the persons and the ornaments of women, 
while he treated the captive wife, mother and daughters 
of Darius with royal respect and dignity, unparal­
leled for the time.7
Alexander’s charismatic personality was not di­
vorced from his foreign policy. His charisma was 
reflected in the success of his military campaigns, 
foreign policy and administration. Perhaps the most 
important feature in Alexander’s over all policy 
was his enlighted personal’rule. The enlighted leader­
ship of Alexander was a function of his unusual cha­
risma and his educational background, greatly enrich­
ed by the teaching of Aristotle and Isocrates, and 
shaped further by the cosmopolitan spirit of the age.
As it has previously been mentioned, Alexander’s 
foreign policy at the start of his reign was almost 
identical with that of his father. He began his inter­
national adventures from the point at which his fa­
ther left off, namely a military expedition against the 
Persian Empire. Macedonia was clearly on an expan­
sionists move in the fourth century with prime 
object and concern the creation of an empire of 
large dimensions and power, establishing itself as the 
dominant power in the Greek world and the Balkans.
Under Philip’s dynamic leadership the state of 
Macedonia began to expand in all four directions. 
After a series of brilliant military operations and even 
more brilliant diplomatic victories by Philip, the state 
of Macedonia by 336 B.C. had forced almost all of 
the Greek city-states, the peoples of Illyria, Thrace 
and those inhabiting the areas south of the Danube, 
to submit to her control and administration.
5. Op. cit., Tarn, Alexander the Great, Vol. II, p. 449.
6. Op. cit., Plutarch, Lives, p. 287.
7. ibid., p. 283.
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In order to consolidate his rule in the empire, and 
to reorganize the conquered nations under the Mac­
edonian «ideology» and institutions, Philip needed 
an effective foreign and domestic policy. This policy 
was made up mainly of two parts. The first pertained 
to the «Inner Front.» Internal peace, order and se­
curity, according to Philip’s policy, rested on the co­
operation of the subjects with the empire. For this 
reason he worked laboriously to organize and fi­
nance pro-Macedonian parties in a number of the 
city-states by aiding net only the oligarchies and 
tyrannies but assisting also any faction which prom­
ised to further Macedonian interests.1
Within his «Inner Front» policy, Philip allowed 
for double standards. He offered cooperation and 
cultural amalgamation to the Greek-speaking peo­
ples but excluded the non-Greek people fiom such 
a privilege on the basis of their culture. To the bar­
barians Philip offered only submission.2
The other side of Philip’s policy was concerned 
with external peace and security. The Macedonian 
empire could not be externally and internally secure 
unless all opposition in the Greek world and in the 
Balkans was crushed, and Persia was rolled back 
from the Aegean, the Straits, the Black Sea and Asia 
Minor.
Alexander inherited this roughly-outlined Mac­
edonia policy of imperial expansion. The rebellions 
that occurred soon after he came to power, chal­
lenged his control over the Macedonian empire. 
Alexander reacted swiftly to the crisis, put down 
decisively the rebellions and defended the Mac­
edonian interests.3
The rebellion of the southern Greek city-states 
led by Thebes challenged Alexander’s attitude towards 
the Hellenes. Consistent with the Macedonian for­
eign policy toward the Greeks, Alexander refrained 
from using brute force at the beginning and demanded 
only a change in the Theban government. The chief 
aim of Macedonia in regard to her relations with the 
city-states was to install pro-Macedonian satellite 
governments there, thus avoiding using force unless 
the situation was out of control. When his de­
mand was not satisfied, Alexander put aside the 
Macedonian «olive branch» and used the thunder.4
In dealing with the governments of the various 
city-states, Alexander tended to differ with the pol­
icy of his father. Instead of supporting oligarchies 
and tyrannies as Philip for the most part had done, 
Alexander preferred to support democracies. Thus 
he stimulated the democratic forces and supported 
changes and revolutions which overthrew the reac­
1. Op. cit., Hicks and Hill, p. 304.
2. Op. cit., Fuller, pp. 36, 37.
3. Op. cit., Plutarch, Lives, p. 283.
4. Ibid., p. 255.
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tionary oligarchs and aristocrats in favor of the 
democratic commerce oriented classes.
In 333-332 B.C. Alexander instigated and foster­
ed social revolutions in Chios, Erythrae, Eresos, and 
other city-states. These revolutions overthrew the 
pro-Persian oligarchies in favor of the pro-Macedo­
nian democracies.5 In 378 Eresos joined the new 
Athenian Confederacy and remained democratic 
until the Social War in 357 B.C. Then the town 
came under the Persian influence. Three tyrants who 
were also brothers named Hermon, Heraios and 
Appolodoros ruled the towns until 334 B. C. During 
the year of the battle of Granikos Alexander pro­
moted a revolution in Eresos with democratic 
forces coming to power.6
It must be pointed out here, that probably Alex­
ander was not supporting .democracies because he 
believed in the ideology and was emotionally or 
intellectually committed to the system. Probably he 
discovered that the goals of his foreign policy were 
best promoted by supporting social change leading 
to democracies. The opportunism of Alexander is 
shown in the oration of Demosthenes, on the 
Treaty with Alexander, delivered about 333 B.C. in 
which Alexander is accused of a double-standard 
policy and inconsistency of maintaining tyrants in 
Messenia and expelling them in Eresos.7
The attitude of Alexander towards the peoples of 
the Orient was basically consistent with the main 
concepts and aims of the Macedonian foreign policy. 
However, a marked difference was the radical 
change that occurred in the Macedonian principle of 
cooperation.
Since the overwhelming number of the subjects 
in Alexander’s empire were classified as barbarians, 
the principle of limited cooperation was obsolete 
for the empire unless it was reformed and broaden­
ed to include all subjects, by striking down the bar­
riers that were separating the Greeks from the bar­
barians. The principle of the Inner Front could not 
be maintained only by the force of arms because of 
the limited resources of Macedonia and the large 
dimensions of the empire.
Alexander’s speech at Opis can be seen as a great 
political performance, promoting his «Grand Poli­
cy.» It is indeed interesting to note that Alexander 
was actually dealing from a strong position at Opis 
against his revolted troops. A few days before the 
showdown at Opis between Alexander and his troops,
5. Op. cit., Hicks and Hill, Nos. 157, 158, 159, pp. 294- 
304.
6. Ibid., Inscription, No 157, pp. 299, 300. Also Demos­
thenes, Olynthiacs, Philippics, Minor Public Speeches against 
Leptines, Vol. I., translated by J. H. Vince (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 368, 469.
7. Op. cit., Hicks and Hill, p. 300 ; Demosthenes, pp. 465- 
483.
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a powerful military force of 30,000 young Persian 
troops, trained for almost ten years in the Mace­
donian art of war and in the ideals of the Macedo­
nian Empire had arrived at Opis and had camp­
ed in the outskirts of the city.1
They were splendidly equipped with the full Mac­
edonian armament and encamped before the city, 
where they were warmly commended by their king 
after demonstrating their skill and discipline in the 
use of their weapons. The Macedonians had not only 
mutinied when ordered to cross the Ganges River 
but were frequently unruly when called into an 
assembly and lidiculed Alexander’s pretence that 
Ammon was his father. For these reasons Alexander 
had formed this unit from a homogeneous age-group 
of Persians, capable of serving as a counter-balance 
to the Macedonian phalanx.2
Although the «Grand Policy» of Alexander, 
contained some elements of the old Macedonian for­
eign and domestic policies of Philip II, it was a 
unique international program. It seems to have been 
born out of three ideas or purposes. First, it was the 
desire of Alexander to include in his empire and to 
bring under his personal rule a wide number of 
Asian and African nations.3
The second idea was identified with the expansion­
ist policy of Macedonia in Greece and the Balkans 
and the consolidation of her control in these areas. 
The «liberation» of Asia Minor and the defeat of 
Persia was, according to the Macedonian policy, a 
political and military necessity for securing and 
organizing the conquered territories and peoples of 
Greece and the Balkans. The defeat of Persia was of 
prime importance for the Macedonian plan of ex­
pansion and consolidation. Darius III, the Great 
King of Persia, was sabotaging the Macedonian 
policy by encouraging Greek statesmen to resist 
Macedonia and was offering them great sums of 
money for this purpose.4
The third idea pertains to the desire and drive 
of Alexander to win the «peace offensive» and to 
consolidate his power and rule within the vast ter­
ritories and numerous peoples which his military 
victories had brought under his control.
Homonoia was to be, according to Alexander, a 
powerful political weapon to be used in order to 
solve the problems of the empire and to create a 
new order through unity. Using the concept of Ho­
monoia Alexander wanted to arrest the class
1. Op. cit., Plutarch, Lives, p. 421.
2. Op. cit,, Diodorus, Vol. VIII, Book XVII, pp. 2-4.
3. Curtius, Quintus, History of Alexander, Vols. I and 
II. Translated by JohnC. Rolfe. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1962, p. 495.
4. Trever, Albert A., History of Ancient Civilization, Voi.
I. New York: Brace and Company, 1936, p. 452.
struggle, and the political, religious and economic 
crises as well as the hostility between the Greeks and 
the Asians which stemmed from their numerous 
conflicts. As such, Homonoia was to iron out these 
differences and struggles through a cultural fusion, 
colonization of certain key areas of the East by Greeks 
and Macedonians, economic reorganization of the 
empire, and a political system of Monarchy with 
democratic features.
Cultural fusion was to be brought about primarily 
through intermarriages. The second marriage of 
Alexander was clearly a politically motivated action, 
designed well in advance and executed at the proper 
time and place. In March 324 B. C., the armies of 
Hephaestion and Alexander and the fleet under the 
leadership of Nearchus met at Sousa as the military 
campaigns of Alexander came to an end.5 As soon 
as Alexander came to Sousa, he shifted his attention 
and policy from the military sphere to those of peace, 
stability, and the reorganization of his empire.
By the summer of 324 Alexander’s policy was 
underway with the introduction of the campaign 
of cultural fusion. In a five-day grand feast he in­
troduced mass intermarriage between his troops and 
the Persian women, «in order that by this sacred 
alliance might abolish all distinction between van­
quished and victor.»®
The policy of colonization was another method 
used by Alexander aiming to arrest the national 
uprisings of the various national groups in the 
empire, promote commerce and industry and keep 
the vast areas of the Near East under his control, 
using the colonists to maintain the status quo.7
With Alexander began one of the most important 
colonization movements in history. This particular 
development brought about a certain degree of 
unity in the economic circles of Greece and the na­
tions of the East that enabled the Greeks to establish 
themselves as the dominant nation in the Orient 
for more than one thousand years.
Alexander ’s conquests destroyed forever the slowly 
decaying city-state system and in its place erected 
the system of imperial monarchy based on cosmopol­
itanism and world politics.8 Due to his exceptional 
charisma, dynamic and enlightened leadership, Alex­
ander became a hero for the entire world. To many 
people in the Orient his deification fulfilled a psycho­
logical gap. The world recognition, respect, admira­
tion, and fear which Alexander enjoyed, helped to 
strengthen the Macedonian policy of imperial expan­
sion and to make his and Homonoia indispensible 
elements in the transition from Polis to Oikoumene.
5. Op. cit., Wheeler, p. 373.
6. Op. cit., Curtius, p. 495.
7. Ibid., p. 485.
8. Op. cit., Trever, p. 468.
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